Krauthammer's Plan B

Columnist Charles Krauthammer articulates a Plan B, predicated on the premise that the surge won't work because the Maliki government is unable to forge a national consensus that eclipses sectarian divisions (largely because the Maliki government is acting as a Shi'ite revenge force).

Quote of note:

We need to define that intermediate strategy. Right now there are only three policies on the table: (1) the surge, which a majority of Congress opposes, (2) the status quo, which everybody opposes, and (3) the abandonment of Iraq, which appears to be the default Democratic alternative.

What is missing is a fourth alternative, both as a threat to Maliki and as an actual fallback if the surge fails. The Pentagon should be working on a sustainable Plan B whose major element would be not so much a drawdown of troops as a drawdown of risk to our troops. If we had zero American casualties a day, there would be as little need to withdraw from Iraq as there is to withdraw from the Balkans.

We need to find a redeployment strategy that maintains as much latent American strength as possible, but with minimal exposure. We say to Maliki: Let us down, and we dismantle the Green Zone, leave Baghdad and let you fend for yourself; we keep the airport and certain strategic bases in the area; we redeploy most of our forces to Kurdistan; we maintain a significant presence in Anbar province, where we are having success in our one-front war against al-Qaeda and the Baathists. Then we watch. You can have your Baghdad civil war without us. We will be around to pick up the pieces as best we can.

Andrew Sullivanhas been arguing for a similar strategy. It does have logic behind it. It does put the onus on the Iraqis. It's short of an outright defeat.

But. Do we really stand passively by, like the UN in Rwanda, as a massacre ensues?